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Two stylized facts regarding the relationship between education and marriage are very well
known. First, individuals who invest more in education tend to marry more educated partners
than those who invest less, i.e. there is a positive assortative mating on education. Second,
while individuals who invest more in education tend to marry later in life, at higher ages they
are nevertheless more are more likely to be married.
The positive assortative mating in the marriage market has led to a popular argument that
one part of an individual's economic return to acquiring education obtains through an increased
probability of marrying a more qualied and higher-earning spouse. Indeed, this argument was
made forcefully by Claudia Goldin (1992) who went so far as to argue that improving the chances
of marrying a college-educated man was the main motive for women for entering college. The
hypothesis that by acquiring education an individual can aect the identity of his/her future
spouse however assumes that education has a causal eect on the individual's marriage outcome.
This is not implied by the observed positive assortative mating: whom an individual marries
may well be determined by factors such as social background, geographic location, etc., factors
that are also correlated with education, and could lead the observed correlation in spouses'
education to be partly or wholly spurious.
In this paper we present new evidence on the eect of education on marital outcomes for
women using UK data. To do so we exploit a particular historical feature of the educational
system in England and Wales. In particular, we use that, in the past, individuals who were born
in the rst ve months of the academic year (September through January) were allowed to leave
school at the end of the spring term in the year in which they reached the compulsory schooling
age of 16, whereas those born in the remaining seven months (February through August) had
to stay on for one more term. For the academic cohorts that we consider, this feature, due
to its interaction with the timing of examinations, implied a substantial eect of date of birth
on academic attainment: those born after the January-February threshold date are signicantly
2more likely to hold some academic qualication than those born before the threshold date.1 Our
identication strategy will hence involve exploring how marital outcomes vary with month of
birth, and to relate those dierences to the observed dierences in academic attainment. The
main ndings from the paper can be summarized as follows. Using data on individuals belonging
to 14 academic cohorts born between September 1957 and August 1971 from the UK Labour
Force Survey we nd that:
 Women born after the January-February threshold date (who were required to stay on
for one more term) are close to four percentage points more likely to hold some academic
qualication than those born before the threshold.
 Holding an academic qualication does not aect the probability of a woman being cur-
rently married: women born before the threshold are as likely to be currently married as
women born after the threshold.
 Holding an academic qualication does aect the properties of a woman's spouse: women
born after the threshold date are more likely to be married to men who hold some academic
qualication and are economically active.
Since the social structures of marriage were rst brought to light, much eort has been de-
voted to measuring marital patterns across time, countries and subgroups of the population.2
Despite this substantial literature, surprisingly little is known about to what extent an individ-
ual's education choice aects her marital outcomes. Indeed, only a very small literature has
applied statistical techniques that have allowed causal interpretations for the ndings regarding
the impact of education. Here we briey review this modest literature.
Looking rst at the eect of education on marital status, there appears to be a short-run
eect of staying in school longer, consistent with individuals delaying marriage; however, turning
to marital status later in life, education appears to have little or no eect on the probability of
1Del Bono and Galindo-Rueda (2006), focusing on the wage returns to education, present similar nding using,
in part, the same data.
2For early studies of marital patterns, see Hunt (1940), Burgess and Wallin (1943) and Rockwell (1976).
3an individual being married. E.g. Duo et al. (2010), using data from Kenya, investigate the
eect of an educational program which reduced the cost of education by providing free school
uniforms. The program was implemented among students enrolled in grade 6 in 2003, and was
found to have reduced the probability of girls being married two years later. Similarly, Kirdar
et al. (2010) exploit the extension of compulsory schooling in Turkey from ve to eight year
in 1997. Their nd that the schooling reform brought about a reduction in the frequency of
young (by age 17) marriages. In contrast, the analysis of Fort (2007) suggests that any eect
of increased schooling on timing of marriage must have been short: exploiting the 1963 reform
act in Italy which increased the minimum school leaving age from 11 to 14, Fort nds no causal
eect of education on probability of age at rst marriage between ages 18-26. Turning to even
longer horizons, Breierova and Duo (2004) make use of a large school construction program
in Indonesia between 1973 and 1978, the timing of which varied across regions. Using data
from the 1995 Indonesiam Intercensal Survey and focusing on women, the authors found that
increased education leads to a higher age at rst marriage, but has no impact on the probability
of a woman being currently married. Further evidence suggesting no signicant long run eect
of education on marital status is provided by Lefgren and McIntyre (2006) who, following the
approach of Angrist and Krueger (1991), use quarter of birth as instrument for educational
attainment, applied on U.S. Census data. While their point estimate for the causal eect of
an additional year of education on the probability of a woman being married on census day is
negative, the eect is statistically insignicant.
Even less is known about to what extent positive assortative mating on education can be
given a causal interpretation, i.e. to what extent an increase in an individual's education leads
her to marry a more qualied spouse. However, the evidence that does exist suggests a positive
causal eect. Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) use data on 600 married female monozygotic
twins from the Minnesota Twins Registry. They show that the correlation between spouses'
education is signicantly lower when using variation in education within twins pairs than when
using cross-sectional variation. Nevertheless the authors still nd that a woman's education
has a causal eect on the schooling of her spouse: a one-year increase in schooling for a woman
4increases the schooling of her spouse by little less than 0.4 of a year. Using the same technique on
Norwegian administrative data on married siblings and twins-pairs, Oreopoulous and Salvanes
(2009) nd that a one year increase in an individual's education increases the spouse's length
of schooling by about 0.23 of a year. Lefgren and McIntyre (2007) using quarter of birth as
instrument (see above) nds that an extra year of education increases husband's earnings by
about $4,000. Relatedly, McCrary and Royer (2006) use natality data from California and Texas,
which includes information on the mother's exact date of birth. They show that women born
just after the state school entry cut-o date have less education and also less educated partners.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. The next section discusses the conceptual
and identication issues using a simple theoretical model. Section III details the institutional
context. After describing the data in Section IV, we present our main results in Section V.
Section VI concludes.
II Conceptual Issues: Equilibrium Education and Marriage
What are the channels through which an individual's choice of education can have a causal eect
on her marital outcome? There are three distinct possibilities: (i) an individual's education may
impact on how many potential partners she meets; (ii) it may impact on which potential partners
she meets; (iii) it may aect the likelihood of any given match leading to marriage.
There are relatively few available theoretical models of marriage markets with pre-marital
investments in education. A recent exception is Chiappori et al. (2009).3 They model a
frictionless marriage market in the style of Becker (1973, 1991). Hence, in terms of the three
channels outlined above, their model focuses on the last channel. Here we sketch a model
with frictions which allows for channel (ii). The essentials of the model are as follows. Each
individual is associated with a set of background characteristics (ability, parental income, etc)
which play two roles: (i) they aect the individual's cost of education, and (ii) they may directly
aect the individual's (equilibrium) probability of matching with a skilled potential partner.
3See also Peters and Siow (2002).
5The individual's education choice may also impact on her chance of matching with a skilled
potential partner. A match may be turned down on economic grounds due to asymmetry in
earnings. The model thus generally features assortative mating, which may or may not have a
causal interpretation. The purpose of the model is primarily to aid the discussion of empirical
identication. To that end, the model includes an instrumental variable, uncorrelated with the
individual's other characteristics, which only aects the cost of education.
The main results to take away from the analysis are the following. First, the eect of
education on the probability of marriage is generally heterogenous in the population. Second,
a key requirement for the instrumental variable is that it must not directly aect with whom
an individual matches, a requirement discussed in some detail below. Third, if the instrumental
variable does satisfy this requirement, then it is possible to identify an average eect of education
on the probability of marriage. Fourth, if furthermore, if education has no impact on the
marriage probability (for those whose education decisions strictly depend on the instrument), it
is also possible to identify an average eect of education on partner's skill level.
A Simple Model of Education and Marriage
Consider an economy with continuums (of equal size) of women and men.4 For notational
simplicity ignore gender dierences. Each individual i is associated with an k-dimensional vector
of characteristics i which has a discrete distribution, represented by a p.d.f. f () dened over
a support A. There is also a binary instrumental variable zi 2 f0;1g. A key assumption is that
zi is independent of the individual's other characteristics.
Assumption 1 The instrument is independent of the individual's other characteristics, zi ?i.
Individual i decides whether or not to invest in education, xi 2 f0;1g. The individual's
investment cost, denoted c(i;zi), is, for simplicity, modelled as a direct utility cost.
Assumption 2 The instrument reduces the cost of education, c(i;1) < c(i;0) for all i 2 A.
4The current model draws in part on the model by Lommerud and Konrad (2008).
6After deciding on education, individual i meets with one potential partner, denoted  i. The
potential partner,  i, may be either skilled or unskilled, x i 2 f0;1g.
Assumption 3 The probability that individual i matches with a skilled potential partner depends
on her characteristics and on her skill level and is denoted p(i;xi).
Note that p(i;xi) is an equilibrium probability. The crucial aspect of Assumption 3 is that
zi does not directly aect the equilibrium probability of matching with a skilled partner.
The match between i and  i is associated with match quality i 2 R which enters the utility
of both partners additively if they marry. i is a continuous random variable which is i.i.d.
across potential couples, and with c.d.f. G(i). The skill level of individual i determines her
earnings yi 2 fy0;y1g where y1 > y0. If individual i does not marry, her consumption is her
own earnings ci = yi. If she does marry, then her consumption is ci = (1   )yi + y i where
 2 [0;1=2] indicates the degree of consumption sharing which is assumed to be positive and
xed.
The Marriage Decision
Individual i will agree to marry  i if and only if (1   )yi + y i + i  yi. However, for the
match to lead to marriage,  i must also agree to marry i. Trivially, if they have the same skill
level, they marry if and only if i  0. If one is skilled and one is unskilled, they marry if and
only if i  y  0 where y  y1   y0. Dene s  1   G(0) and m  1   G(y) as the
probability of marriage conditional on a \skill-symmetric" (s) match and a \mixed-skill" (m)
match, respectively, with s  m.
The Investment Decision
The benet to individual i from investing in education is given by the change in expected utility
from consumption and match quality.5 This can be written is
B (i)  y + (s   m)fp(i;1)   [1   p(i;0)]g   my f[1   p(i;1)] + p(i;0)g; (1)
5Formally the benet B (i) is dened as the dierence E [ci + miji;xi = 1]   E [ci + miji;xi = 0].
7where s  E [I0] and m  E [Iy] (where IS is the indicator function which is unity if
S is true and zero otherwise), with s > m. The rst term in (1) is the earnings increase. The
second term is non-negative if investing in education increases the probability of a skill-symmetric
match. The third component is non-positive since the individual may suer a consumption
sharing loss when skilled, whereas she may gain from consumption sharing when unskilled.
Individual i invests if and only if the benet exceeds the cost; formally, x(i;zi)  IB(i)c(i;zi).
Note that even cost-irrelevant personal characteristics may aect the individual's education de-
cision. Since zi reduces the cost of education, there will generally be a set of types who invest
if and only if zi = 1. Hence dene the (equilibrium) set
A  fi 2 Ajx(i;1) = 1 and x(i;0) = 0g; (2)
and assume that this a non-empty subset of A. Following Angrist et al. (1996) we refer to A
as the set of \compliers".
Equilibrium
While it is not necessary for the current purposes to characterize the details of the equilibrium,
we will outline what doing so would entail. To complete the model, the matching technology
would need to be specied. As an example, suppose that i and xi are summarized in an
unidimension index Ii = i + xi + "i for some vector , scalar , and \error" "i (unknown
to the individual when deciding on education) and assume that individuals match by rank of
Ii. If  = 0, this simply leads to a correlation between i and  i. When  > 0, individual i
can increase Ii by investing in skills and hence aect the probability distribution over  i and
x i. Turning to the description of an equilibrium, the probability function p(;x) depends on
the investment function x(;z) via the matching technology; conversely, individual behaviour
x(;z) depends on p(;x). An equilibrium (corresponding to a xed point) consists of two
mutually consistent functions.6
6In principle, an equilibrium may be in mixed strategies. However, we assume the existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium.
8The Eect of Education on Marital Outcomes
Let (i;xi) denote marriage probability of individual i given her characteristics and skill level.
The eect of education on the marriage probability of individual i is then
(i)  (i;1)   (i;0) = fp(i;1)   [1   p(i;0)]g(s   m); (3)
which may be either positive or negative and is generally heterogenous in the population. E.g. a
characteristic that increases the individual's chances of matching with a skilled potential partner
(for either own skill level) will increase the individual eect of education on the probability of
marriage. There are two cases in which education has no impact on the marriage probability of
individual i: (i) when there is no income sharing ( ! 0) and all marriages are entirely \love-
based", and (ii) when the probability of a \skill-symmetric match" is the same for both skill
levels: p(i;1) = 1 p(i;0). Note that while the rst case implies that the eect of education
on the marriage probability is zero for everyone, the latter condition may hold for some types
but not for others.
Consider next the eect of education on the partner's skill level. Since we will only observe
the partners to married individuals, we interpret the eect of education on partner's skill level
for individual i as the dierence in the probability of her partner being skilled, conditional on








A sucient condition for x i (i) to be strictly positive is that p(i;1)  p(i;0) and
s  m, with at least one of the inequalities being strict. Hence as long as (i) investing
in education leads to a better chance of matching with a skilled potential partner, and (ii)
skill-symmetric matches having a higher acceptance rate than mixed-skill matches, education
7Formally, we dene the eect of education on the partner's skill level as
x i (i)  Pr(x i = 1jmi = 1;i;xi = 1)   Pr(x i = 1jmi = 1;i;xi = 0):
Expression (4) follows from applying Bayes' rule.
9will have a positive eect on partner skill level. Note that x i (i) can be non-zero even if
education has no eect on the individual's marriage probability.
Identication
Assume now that we have a random sample of women. For each woman we observe her marital
status mi, skill level xi, instrument zi, and, if married, the skill level of her partner, x i. We
assume here that i is completely unobserved. Given that zi only inuences mi via xi an IV
approach can be expected to identify the eect of education on marriage. To this end, note
that, using the law of iterated expectations, E [mijzi] = E [(i;x(i;zi))jzi]. Taking the
dierence of this expectation between zi = 1 and zi = 0, exploiting the independence of i
and zi and noting that only compliers contribute to this dierence, yields E [(i)ji 2 A]
P
i2A f (i). By a similar logic, E [xijzi = 1]   E [xijzi = 0] =
P
i2A f (i) measures the
fraction of compliers in the population. Hence, following the logic of Imbens and Angrist (1994),
we have that
E [mijzi = 1]   E [mijzi = 0]
E [xijzi = 1]   E [xijzi = 0]
= E [(i)ji 2 A]: (5)
The IV/Wald estimator, which replaces the expectations on the left hand side with the corre-
sponding sample means, is hence a consistent estimator for the average eect of education on
marriage probability among compliers.
Identication of the eect of education on partner's skill level is complicated not only by
endogeneity of xi but also by selection into marriage. In the absence of a second instrumental
variable (aecting marriage probability), we can identify the eect of education on partner's
skill level under the assumption that education does not aect the probability of an individ-
ual being married. However, we do not need to assume that the probability of marriage is
skill-independent for everyone: under the IV strategy, we only need the marriage probability
to be skill-independent for those types whose education decisions are actually aected by the
instrument.
Assumption 4 The marriage probability is skill-independent for all compliers: (i;1) =
10(i;0) = b (i) for all i 2 A.
Assumption 4 implies that E [mijzi] is independent of zi which is of course what is tested by
the IV/Wald estimator of the eect of education on marriage probability. Under Assumption 4
it can be shown that
E [x ijmi = 1;zi = 1]   E [x ijmi = 1;zi = 0]
E [xijmi = 1;zi = 1]   E [xijmi = 1;zi = 0]
= Eb f [x i (i)ji 2 A]; (6)
where the notation b f indicates that the expectation over  2 A is taken using the marriage-
probability weighted density (which is dened only for compliers and under Assumption 4)
b f (i)  b (i)f (i)=
P
2A b ()f () rather than the standard conditional density. The
IV/Wald estimator, which replaces the expectations on the left hand side with the corresponding
sample means, is hence, under Assumption 4, a consistent estimator for the (weighted) average
eect of education on partner skill level among compliers.
Further Issues
The above model, while fairly general, does contain a few restrictive features. First, it assumes
that education preceeds marriage. In the analysis below, we will use as education measure an
indicator for whether an individual holds any academic qualication. Since this is typically
determined by exam taken at the age of 16 in the UK, we perceive this to be a negligable issue.
Second, the model assumes that each individual meets precisely one potential partner. This
reduces \competition" in the marriage market relative to cases where individuals meet multiple
potential partners. Nevertheless, we believe that the identication strategy would continue to
be valid in more general settings.
A crucial, but somewhat subtle, assumption in the model is that the instrument zi aects
the probability of matching with a skilled potential partner only via the individual's chosen
education. This is non-trivial requirement that will fail for some commonly used instruments
for educational attainment. Consider e.g. using the raising of a school leave age as instrument
for education. The instrument zi would be \switched on" for birth cohorts born after a certain
date. However, since an individual's birth-cohort constitutes a marriage-market relevant social
11grouping, the instrument will directly aect the probability of matching with a skilled potential
partner. Intuitively, comparing the marriage outcomes of individuals born before and after
the cuto birth date for being aected by the raising of the school leaving age will confound
individual eects of education with general equilibrium eects of an increased level of education
in the marriage market. The same comments apply to e.g. distance to college when marriage
markets have a geographical dimension. The current setting where there is an educational-
attainment relevant threshold date within the academic year hence provide a unique opportunity
to study the eect of academic qualications on marital outcomes.8
III Institutional Context
The school education system in the UK is divided into three stages: primary education, com-
pulsory secondary education and post-compulsory secondary education. While the education
and training systems of England, Wales and Northern Ireland are broadly similar, the education
system in Scotland has always been completely independent with its own laws and practices. In
the following, we will focus on the education system in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
School Entry Policy
The academic year runs from September 1 to August 31 with three terms starting in September,
January, and April, respectively. By UK law, all children of compulsory school age (between 5
and 16) must receive a full-time education. In England and Wales, children must start school at
the beginning of the term after they turn 5. There is, however, signicant variation in admissions
policies across local education authorities (LEAs). While the statutory policy is adopted by
only around 1% of LEAs, most LEAs operate a triple-entry-point system that admits children
8Note that even using date of birth relative to the cuto date between academic cohorts (in our case, the
August-September threshold) could fail the identifying assumption in so far as an individual's academic cohort
constitute a marriage-market relevant social grouping. This is suggested by the nding of McCrary and Royer
(2006) who use date of birth relative to school entry cuto as instrument for educational attainment for mothers
in Texas and California, and nd that mothers born after the school entry cuto date have younger partners.
12at the beginning of the term in which they turn 5. The system that is becoming increasingly
popular over time is based on a single-entry-point, which implies that all children start school
in September of the academic year in which they turn 5, regardless of age. Nearly half of the
children born between 1997 and 1999 started school in an LEA where this single-entry-point
system was in operation (see Crawford et al. 2007)
School Leaving Policy
The British government has raised the minimum school leaving age several times since the
introduction of compulsory education in 1870. The main motivations given have been focused
on generating more skilled labour by providing additional time for students to gain skills and
qualications. The current school leaving age of 16 has been in force since September 1973, as a
result of the Raising of School Leaving Age (RoSLA) Order of 1972. This built on the previous
RoSLA from 14 to 15 which occurred in April 1947, following the 1944 \Butler" Education Act.
Unlike in the US, children in the UK are generally not deemed to have attained the age of
compulsory schooling, and therefore allowed to leave school, on the exact date in which they
themselves attain the age of 16. Since the Education Act of 1962 and up until 1997, the minimum
school leaving age arrangements were as follows:
 A child whose sixteenth birthday fell in the period September 1 to January 31 inclusive,
was allowed to leave compulsory schooling at the end of the Spring term (which ends just
before Easter).
 A child whose sixteenth birthday fell in the period February 1 to August 31, was allowed
to leave on the Friday before the last Monday in May.9
From 1998 onward, a new single school leaving date was set as the last Friday in June in
the school year in which the child reaches the age of 16, as a result of the 1996 Education Act.
However, since our empirical analysis will focus on individuals who attained the minimum school
9The justication for dual exit dates seems to have been the belief that a common exit date, with entire cohorts
leaving school at the same time, would negatively aect the functioning of the labour market. [REF]
13leaving age of 16 during the 1970s and the 1980s, the earlier school leaving arrangements will
be the relevant ones for our purposes.
The combination of the school entry policy and the school leaving policy implied two distinct
discontinuities in required length of schooling with respect to date of birth. First, a discontinuity
obtained at the cuto dates between academic cohorts, i.e. at the August-September threshold.
While August-born children were forced to stay until the end of the school year, September-born
children were allowed to leave at Easter. Since those born after the threshold date have shorter
required schooling, this discontinuity has strong similarities to the discontinuities generated
by school entry policy in the US as used by Angrist and Krueger (1991) and many after them.
Second, a discontinuity obtains also at the winter cuto date for being allowed to leave at Easter,
i.e. at the January-February threshold. While January-born children were allowed to leave at
Easter, February-born children were forced to stay until the end of the school year. Although the
two discontinuities at a rst glance appear to be \ipsides" of each other there is nevertheless an
important dierence: while the rst discontinuity obtained between academic cohorts, the second
discontinuity obtained within academic cohorts. The fact the rst discontinuity obtains between
academic cohorts implies that the required length of schooling is not the only dierence between
individuals born on opposite sides of the threshold. Those born after the threshold would start
school later than those born before it and would belong to a one-year later academic cohort:
hence those born after the threshold would have a higher absolute age at school start and also
a higher age relative to their academic cohort peers. In contrast, for the second discontinuity,
by virtue of January and February born children belonging to the same academic cohort, and
generally starting school at the same time, neither age eect would have obtained. For this
reason the second discontinuity has stronger appeal as a pure required education eect and will
be the one focused on in this paper.
The signicance of the discontinuity is, however, not only that it implies a nominal dierence
of two to three months (one term) of required schooling. More importantly, it interacts with the
qualication system in England and Wales under which students aged 16 sit crucial intermediate-
level examinations at the end of the summer term.
14Exams Sat at 16
At the end of ve years of compulsory secondary education, students in England and Wales
take exams in a range of subjects. Historically, dierent types of schools entered their pupils
for dierent examinations at age 16. Students who were academically inclined and attended
\grammar schools" would take General Certicate of Education Ordinary Levels (\GCE O-level)
examinations. In contrast, less academically oriented students attending \secondary modern
schools" could take the Certicate of Secondary Education (CSE) examinations at 16 before
leaving school. Less demanding than GCE O-level, results in the CSE exams were nevertheless
graded on the same scale, with the top CSE grade, grade 1, being equivalent to a simple pass
at GCE O-level.
The introduction in 1988 of the General Certicate of Secondary Education (GCSE), which
superseded the O-level and CSE exams, marked a turning point in UK educational system. The
GCSE is a single subject exam and students usually take up to ten (there is no upper limit)
GCSE exams in dierent subjects. Students are given a letter score of A-G where A is the
top grade. Although grades A-G are all ocially pass grades, only grades A to C are generally
regarded as equivalent to the \pass" grades in the previous O-level system.
Our empirical analysis will focus on the academic cohorts that faced the previously existing
O-level/CSE system for which we observe a signicant dierence in academic attainment by date
of birth relative to the January-February threshold. With the introduction of the more inclusive
GSCE system, the fraction of individuals holding some academic qualication increased and the
date of birth eect vanishes. Moreover, we will focus on those cohorts that faced the minimum
school leaving age of 16. Under the previous age of 15, whether or not a student could leave at
Easter was eectively inconsequential since leaving at the earliest possible date meant leaving
school a year prior to the qualications-generating examinations sat at age 16.10 Hence in our
analysis below, the main focus will be on individuals born after September 1957 (and hence born
10Even when the minimum school leaving age was 16, students leaving at Easter had the option of returning for
exams and evidence suggests that a substantial fraction of students did so (Del Bono and Galindo-Rueda, 2006).
15late enough to face the current age 16 minimum school leaving age) but born before August
1971 (and hence born early enough to face the previous O-level/CSE examination system).
IV Data and Sample
The data we will use comes from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) which is the largest regular
household survey in the United Kingdom and is intended to be representative of the whole UK
population. The sample design currently consists of about 60,000 responding households every
quarter, representing about 0.2% of the British population. Prior to 1992 LFS data is available
on an annual basis, based on interviews taking place in the Spring (March-May). However,
since 1992 LFS data is available on a quarterly basis.11 We pool data from the survey years
1984 to 2006. The LFS surveys prior to 1983 are not comparable with later surveys because of
inconsistencies in measurement, denitions and coverage, while 2006 is the last year for which
month of birth has been made publicly available.
The LFS is suitable for our purposes due to its size and since it contains the basic information
needed for our application: year and month of birth, ethnicity, educational attainment, marital
status, and employment status.
The basic sample criteria we use are as follows. We select women born and currently living
in England or Wales who are aged 18 or above at the time of interview.12 As noted above, in
11Indeed, with the restructuring of the LFS in 1992, the survey was transformed into a \rotating panel". Each
quarter's LFS sample is made up of ve \waves". Each wave is interviewed in ve successive quarters, such that in
any one quarter, one wave will be receiving their rst interview, one wave their second, and so on, with one wave
receiving their fth and nal interview. However, since we are not interested in time varying characteristics or
outcomes, we will not be making use of the panel structure of the LFS. Instead we will only be using information
provided by individuals in their rst interview.
12Prior to 2001 there is no information about in which country of the UK individuals are born. We then keep
those born in the UK and currently living in England and Wales. Hence for earlier survey years there is some
unavoidable degree of noise due to migration from Scotland and Northern Ireland. We do not impose any explicit
upper limit on age. However, per construction, the oldest individual that will be included in the data will be
someone born in the Autumn of 1957 and observed in the Autumn of 2006. Hence no one in the main sample
16our main analysis we further restrict our attention to individuals belonging to a certain set of
academic cohort, in particular, we include individuals born between September 1957 and August
1971.
For each individual we have information on year and month of birth. Since we also know
the year and month of interview we know the individual's age in months when surveyed. For
marital status we will consider exclusively whether or not the individuals is currently married
{ the survey does not allow us to determine any details of the individuals' marital histories.13
We observe the current employment status of each individual and label an individual as being
\economically active" if currently employed or self-employed.
With regards to educational attainment we have several pieces of information. Fundamen-
tally the individuals report the age at which they left continuous full time education and what
qualications they hold. The standard measure of age when leaving full time education is not
the most useful for the current purposes as will be made clear below. Instead we focus on formal
qualications held by the individuals. In particular, we will focus on academic qualications. In-
deed, for most of the analysis we will simply consider whether an individual holds any academic
qualication. There are several reasons for doing so, generally having to do with timing and
exams. First, individuals tend to obtain academic qualications in a certain sequence, implying
that higher levels of qualications are obtained at higher ages. Whether or not an individual
will ever obtain any academic qualication is typically determined by the exams sat at age 16.
Hence when we consider a given academic cohort, as we observe them in across time, they will
tend to improve their composition of academic qualications over time as they age. However, the
fraction of any given cohort that holds some academic qualication is eectively constant across
time. Second, while we also have information on vocational qualications, such qualications
will be aged above 50.
13We focus on whether an individual is currently legally married. Those that are not married hence include
both never married and divorced (and legally separated). Moreover, those currently not married also include
cohabitants. Unfortunately, due to changes in the underlying survey question, the data does not allow us to
identify divorced individuals and cohabitants consistently across time.
17are more frequently obtained at various stages in the individuals' lives. As a result, when we
consider the fraction of any given academic cohort that holds some qualication (academic or
vocational) we observe this fraction to be increasing over time as the cohort ages. Such apparent
\skill upgrading" would cause a host of problems for the analysis, including problems relating
to interpretation; e.g. we would be less certain that skill acquisition comes before marriage.
Third, and fundamentally, the O-level and CSE examinations taken at the age of 16, i.e. at the
end of the academic year in which those born September to January would have the option to
leave at Easter, each provide an academic qualication. As a result we observe larger gaps in
the rate of holding some academic qualication than gaps in the rate of holding any (academic
or vocational) qualication.
Mostly for descriptive purposes we classify the individuals by their highest academic quali-
cation into ve \levels" where (i) \Level 1" denotes a CSE qualication, (ii) \Level 2" denotes
an O-level qualication, (iii) \Level 3" denotes an A-level qualication (an \Advanced Level"
examinations taken at age 18 relevant for entry into higher education), (iv) \Level 4" denotes a
rst degree (or equivalent), and (v) \Level 5" denotes a higher degree (at postgraduate level).
Table 1 provides summary statistics broken down by current marital status. As expected,
married women are, on average, older than unmarried women. Married and unmarried women
have very similar economic activity rates in the current sample. Married women more frequently
hold some academic qualication. The table also shows that there are relatively few ethnic
minority women in our sample, largely due to our focus on individuals born in the UK. Hence
we will not be able to separately consider ethnic minorities in the analysis below. Among the
husbands to the married women in the sample, 68 percent hold some academic qualication and
90 percent are economically active. As a short-hand we refer to individuals born in the months
February-August as \required to stay on". This group constitute 59 percent of the sample.
Month of Birth and Family Background
In theoretical analysis above it was assumed that the instrument zi was uncorrelated with the
individual's characteristics i. In the empirical analysis below the instrument used is based on
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This short section explores briey whether individuals' characteristics are unrelated to their
month of birth.14 It is important to note that even if there is a systematic relationship between
month of birth and some personal characteristic, identication can still be secured in two cases.
The rst case is when the characteristic is observed and hence can be directly controlled for. The
second case is when the distribution of the individual characteristic is continuous with respect
to date of birth at the relevant threshold date. In this latter case, individuals on either side of,
but close to, the threshold are eectively identical in all other respect other than with respect
to the instrument and the analysis above holds for individuals close to the threshold.15 This
motivates why, in the analysis below, we have carefully examined the sensitivity of our estimates
with respect to window size.
We can use the LFS to explore whether there is any systematic relationship between family
background and month of birth by using the fact that the LFS obtains information not only
about the adults in the survey households but also about the children. Hence we can select a
sample of children and relate their months of birth to family characteristics. To this end we use
the LFS annual surveys 1984 to 1991 for which all interviews take place in the spring. We select
all children up to and including the 1974-75 academic cohort who are observed in the academic
year in which they turn 14,15 or 16.16 In order to obtain a larger sample size we include both
girls and boys. This gives a sample of 40,636 children. For this sample of children we measure
14The use of quarter of birth as an instrument for educational attainment in the US context has recently been
criticized by Buckles and Hungerman (2008). They highlight e.g. that women giving birth in the winter months
are more often teenagers, less frequently married, less frequently white, less educated and younger.
15Formally, unbiasedness obtains in the limit as the window size if reduced to zero. See e.g. Hahn, Todd and
van der Klaauw (2001) for a theoretical discussion and McCrary and Royer (2006) for an application.
16The selection rule applied ensures that we capture complete academic cohorts. The earliest academic cohort
included in this sample of children is the 1967-68 academic cohort.
19the parents' academic qualications, economic activity and age at birth (measured in month).17
For the child him/herself we also consider ethnicity.
Figure 1 shows averages of these variable by month of birth of the child. Fathers are about
30 months older than the mothers, and there is no apparent relationship between parents' age
and month of birth of the child. Similarly, the economic activity rate for fathers is about 20
percentage points higher than that for mothers, and there is no apparent relationship to the
child's month of birth. Turning to academic qualications, fathers to children born in the spring
appear to slightly more often hold an academic qualication at the degree level or above (Ac.
Qual. 4-5). Similarly, mothers to spring-born children more often hold a low-level academic
qualication (Ac. Qual. 1-2). Finally, ethnicity shows no particular relation to month of birth.
In so far as there is any family background characteristic that is related to month of birth,
this would cause problems for our analysis particularly if that relationship was discontinuous
at the January-February threshold. In order to consider this possibility, we also perform a
regression analysis where each family background variable is regressed on zi (dened as in (7))
and on a full set of academic cohort- and survey-year dummies. Moreover, each regression is
carried out for ve \window-sizes" around the January-February threshold, starting from a wide
window of ve months on either side of the threshold and going down to a single month on either
side. In line with Figure 1, these regressions, presented in Table 2, indicate no discontinuities
in parents' age and economic activity and in ethnicity. The regressions show that mothers to
spring-born children are more likely to hold a level 1-2 academic qualication; however, since the
dierence disappears as the window-size reduces, there is no evidence of any discontinuity at the
threshold point. The only characteristic for which there are signicant dierences by month of
birth, and which does not diminish as the window-size is reduced, is fathers holding an academic
qualication at degree level or above (level 4-5). Since, in the analysis below, we cannot control
for parents' academic qualication, we need to highlight this as a potential caveat.18
17It should be noted that only parents living in the same household are observed and that parents may include
step-parents.
18Due to this concern we have also explored an alternative data set { the Youth Cohort Surveys { which allows
20V Results
We present our result in three subsections. In the rst subsection we consider how academic
attainment varies with month of birth. We show that those who were required to stay on
are signicantly more likely to hold some academic qualication. In particular, the gap in
attainment obtains on the margin between holding no academic qualication and holding some
low level (level 1 or 2) qualication. We show that the gap in academic attainment diminishes
in later cohorts.
There are two threshold points in the academic year. The rst is the August-September
threshold. Those born after this threshold (i.e. in September onwards) would belong to the
following academic cohort and would generally have to wait to start school relative to those
born before the threshold. Moreover, those born after the this threshold would not have been
required to stay on. The second is the January-February threshold. Individuals on either side
of this threshold would belong to the same academic cohort, but would dier in the requirement
to stay on.
We show that academic attainment changes monotonically at the January-February thresh-
old: those born after the threshold date (and hence would have been required to stay on) have
uniformly higher academic attainment than those individuals born before the threshold date. In
contrast, academic attainment does not change monotonically at the August-September thresh-
old: while those born before this threshold are more likely to hold some low level qualication,
those born after the threshold are more likely to hold some higher level qualication. Due
to this lack of monotonicity at the August-September threshold, we henceforth focus on the
January-February threshold.
In the second subsection we look at marital status. After verifying that individuals with
academic qualications are, at higher ages, more likely to be married, we consider in detail how
us to explore the same relationship for the same academic cohorts and with a similar sample size. In the YCS we
nd evidence of a smaller gap in the rate of fathers' holding a degree, which moreover disappears as the window
size is reduced. Details of this analysis is available on request from the authors.
21the probability of being married varies with month of birth. We nd little evidence of any such
variation. In particular, we cannot nd any evidence that those who were required to stay on in
school are either more or less likely to be married. Hence we conclude that there was no causal
eect of holding an academic qualication on the probability of being currently married.
In the nal subsection we restrict the sample to married women and look at the characteristics
of their spouses. After verifying that holding some academic qualication is strongly positively
correlated with the spouse holding some academic qualication and being economically active,
we consider whether the spouse's characteristics vary with the woman's month of birth. Our
ndings suggest that women who were required to stay on more frequently are married to
husbands who hold some academic qualication and who are economically active. Hence our IV
estimates suggest a causal eect of the woman's academic qualication on the properties of her
spouse.
Month of Birth and Academic Attainment
We begin with an analysis of the relationship between month of birth and academic attainment.
Figure 2 plots the distribution of highest academic qualication by month of birth. There is a
marked increase in the fraction holding a level 1 academic qualication at the January-February
threshold, along with a corresponding decrease in the fraction holding no academic qualica-
tion. The gure also suggests that having been required to stay on is potentially associated
with a slight increase in the probability of holding a level 2 academic qualication. For higher
qualications there is no evidence of any discontinuity at the January-February threshold date.
A key requirement for the instrumental variable approach to generate interpretatable re-
sults is that the impact of the instrumental variable should have a monotonic impact on the
endogenous variable. From Figure 2 it is clear that having been required to stay on increased
the probability of the individual holding some low level of qualication. However, we also want
to compare the cumulative distribution functions of academic attainment for those born before
and after the threshold in order to verify that there is no academic attainment level at or above
which those required to stay on are relatively infrequent. In order to do this we report the
22results from a set of estimated linear probability models where, for each academic qualication
level j, we regress a dummy for the individual holding that level of qualication or above on a
dummy for having been required to stay on, on a set of academic cohort dummies, on a set of
survey year dummies, on a set of ethnicity dummies, and on age-in-months in linear, square and
cubic form.19 Only if all estimated coecients are positive can we argue that those born after
the January-February threshold are unambiguously more academically qualied. Moreover, in
order to explore the sensitivity of the estimates, we vary the \window-size" from four months
on either side of the threshold (i.e. including everyone born September through June) down to
one month on either side (i.e. only including those born in January and February).
Table 3 gives the coecient on having been required to stay on in each regression. The table
conrms that the main eect of having been required to stay on is on the \no qualication"
versus \some qualication" margin: the eect of being born after the threshold on the probability
of holding at least a level 1 academic qualication is economically signicant, around three and
a half percentage point and relatively stable with respect to the window size. The regressions
suggest that those who were required to stay on are also slightly more likely to hold level 2
qualications (O-level or CSE grade 1) and level 4 qualications (rst degree or equivalent).
While level 1 and level 2 qualications would be obtained through exams sat at the age of 16,
the nding of a higher rate of holding level 4 qualications for women born after the threshold
date suggests that some women who were aected by the requirement to remain in school for
one extra term may in fact have responded by staying on even longer. We return to this issue
below. Of key importance for our purposes, the complete absence of any statistically signicant
negative coecients in Table 3 suggests an unambiguously positive impact of being born after
the threshold date on academic attainment.
To contrast this, we perform a similar analysis of academic attainment by month of birth
around the August-September threshold. Figure 3 shows the coecients on having been required
to stay on. The left panel uses a set of windows around the January-February threshold (and
19Note that even two individuals born in the same academic cohort and interviewed in the same calendar year
can dier in age in month due to dierences in month of birth and in month of interview.
23hence displays a subset of the coecients from Table 3). The right panel shows corresponding
estimated coecients on having been required to stay on using a set of windows around the
August-September threshold. Note that in these latter regressions, someone required to stay,
while born in the same calendar year, belongs to a one-year earlier academic cohort than someone
not required to stay on.20 The gure shows that while having been required to stay on monoton-
ically increases academic attainment at the January-February threshold, the same is not true at
the August-September threshold. Individuals born before the August-September threshold (who
were required to stay on) are indeed more likely to hold some academic qualication. However,
they are less likely to hold qualications at levels 2 to 4. This feature likely reects the type of
relative-age-at-school-start eect highlighted by Crawford et al. (2007) whereby those who are
oldest within their academic cohort perform better.
So far we have not considered whether the eect of having been required to stay on was the
same in all academic cohorts. To consider this, Figure 4 plots the fraction of individuals in each
academic cohort, separated into those born before and those born after the threshold, who hold
some academic qualication. For the purpose of this particular gure we have also extended the
sample to include the ve academic cohorts before our main sample and seven cohorts following.
The ve academic cohorts before the current main sample were not aected by the 1973 raising
of the school leaving age (RoSLA) and hence faced a minimum school leaving age of 15. This
meant that everyone had the option of leaving school before the exams at age 16. As a result,
the fraction holding some academic qualication is markedly lower and, specically, there are no
noticeable dierences between those born before and after the January-February thresholds. For
the main sample cohorts, we observe that the rate of holding some academic qualication trends
upwards. Moreover, Figure 4 illustrates how the gap in attainment between those required to
stay on and those not was particularly large in the early years following the RoSLA. Gradually
the gap then reduced. Our main sample stops with the replacement of the CSE and O-level
qualications with the current GCSE (General Certicate of Secondary Education) system: the
20In the analysis of the August-September threshold we control for birth year cohort rather than for academic
cohort.
24nal students to sit the former O-Level/CSE examinations were those of May-June 1987. The
gure shows that only in the rst year of the new system was there any noticeable gap in the
rate of holding some academic qualication.
Above we found that the main impact of the requirement to stay on academic attainment
was to move individuals from the no-qualications group to the level 1 qualications group.
Here we illustrate this in dierent way by looking at the age at which the individuals left full-
time education. Consider the hypothesis that the only eect of the school-leaving policy was to
induce some people born after the January-February threshold date to stay on for exactly one
extra term. Then some January-born children would leave at Easter while the corresponding
individuals born in February would leave a few months later, in the summer. Since both groups
leave education in the same calendar year and after their birthdays, both groups would have the
same age stated in years when leaving education. Hence, under the hypothesis, there should be
no dierences in the distributions of age at leaving full time education between those required
to stay on and those not. We partition age when leaving full time education into four categories:
16 or below, 17, 18, and 19 or above. Table 4 presents estimates of the eect of having been
required to stay on on the probability of leaving full-time education at these various ages, based
on regressions that contain the standard set of controls. The noticeable feature of Table 4 is the
near complete absence of any eect. The only statistically signicant eect obtains at age 18,
with those who were required to stay on being possibly half a percentage point more likely to
leave at age 18. This is consistent with the observation above that those who were required to
stay on appear to slightly more frequently hold intermediate level academic qualications.
To sum up, the requirement to stay in school for one extra term at the compulsory age of
16 imposed on those born after the January-February threshold had an unambiguously positive
impact on their academic attainment, with the main eect being an increase in the rate of
holding a level 1 academic qualication and a corresponding decrease in the rate of holding no
academic qualication.
25Marital Status
We now consider marital status. We start by noting that individuals who invest in education
have lower frequencies of being married at lower ages but higher frequencies of being married
at higher ages. This is highlighted in Figure 5 which shows the fraction of individuals who are
currently married by level of academic attainment relative to individuals who hold no academic
qualication.21 The gure shows how, up until the age of around 28-30, those who obtain a level
4-5 academic qualication (corresponding to university studies) are markedly less frequently
married than those with no qualications. A similar, but smaller, eect is evident for those who
obtain a level 2-3 academic qualication. After the age of 30, however, those with no academic
qualication are the least likely to be married out of all attainment groups, with the gap in
marriage frequency being around 10 percentage point relative to every other level of attainment.
Hence there is a strong association between academic attainment and the probability of being
married. However, it is less clear whether that association reects a causal eect rather than
pure selection. To consider this we examine how the fraction currently married varies with
month of birth.
The upper part of Figure 6 shows the fraction currently married at each age, for individuals
born in the months November-January (and hence not required to stay on) and February-
April (and hence required to stay on) respectively, controlling for academic cohort, survey year,
ethnicity, and for dierences in age in months. Due to the scale it is dicult to visually detect
any dierences. For that reason, the lower part of Figure 6 shows the estimated dierence by
age. The overall dierence (indicated by the hatched line) is actually negative, but very small
and not statistically signicant. Hence, we cannot nd any evidence to suggest that those who
were required to stay on are more likely to be married.
We can also consider in some more detail how the fraction currently married varies with
month of birth. Since we only observe a positive association between (a low level) academic
21Specically, the gure illustrates the coecients on the various levels of academic attainment from regressions,
one for each age, which also includes controls for academic cohort, survey year, and ethnicity.
26qualications and marriage for individuals above their early 20s we focus here on individuals
aged 23 or above. To this end we regress a dummy for being married on a set of month of
birth dummies (leaving out February as reference group), along with a full set of academic
cohort dummies, survey year dummies, ethnicity dummies, and age in months (in linear, square
and cubic form). The left panel of Figure 7 plots the frequency of being currently married by
month of birth relative to February (i.e. the estimated coecient on each month of birth in
the regression). The gure shows that the probability of being married declines slightly with
month of birth within the academic year. This nding is somewhat surprising if one believes
that individuals' demographic life events depend not only on their absolute age, but also on
their \social age" dened by their academic cohort (Skirbekk, Kohler and Prskawetz, 2004).
Nevertheless, the most important aspect is that there is no suggestion of any \discontinuity" at
the January-February threshold date.
In order to explore in further detail whether there is any dierence in marriage frequency we
estimate a set of linear probability models where the dummy for being married is regressed on
a dummy for having been required to stay on along with the same controls as above, but with
varying window sizes around the threshold date. Focusing again on those aged 23 or above, the
right panel of Figure 7 shows the coecient on having been required to stay on (and the 95
percent condence interval) as the window size is gradually reduced from ve months on either
side of the threshold down to only one month on either side. The gure shows that the dierence
in the fraction currently married is eectively zero for all window sizes except the very smallest.
Hence, from this analysis, we conclude that there is no indication that the probability of being
currently married changes discontinuously with month of birth at the threshold point.
Consider then using the dummy for having been required to stay on as an instrumental
variable for estimating the eect of holding an academic qualication on the probability of
being married. Focusing again on individuals aged 23 or above, Table 5 presents the estimated
eect of holding some academic qualication on the probability of currently being married as the
window size is gradually reduced. The OLS estimates consistently show a nine percentage point
increase in the probability of being currently married. The IV estimates are eectively zero (or
27negative) for all window sizes except the smallest one (which is also highly imprecise). Hence
we conclude that for women there is no evidence of any causal eect of holding an academic
qualication on the probability of being currently married.22
Spousal Characteristics
So far we have found that those who, due to being born later in the academic year, were required
to stay on for an extra term more frequently obtained some academic qualication. In contrast,
we could not nd any dierence in the probability of being currently married between those
required to stay on and those not. From this latter observation, we concluded that holding an
academic qualication had no impact on the marriage probability for the group of individuals
whose educational attainment strictly depended on whether they were required to stay on or
not.
We now proceed to study the characteristics of the spouses of the married women in the
sample. We consider two partner characteristics: (i) whether the partner holds any academic
qualication, and (ii) whether or not the partner is economically active. In doing so we rely on
the fact that our nding of no dierence in marriage frequency between those required to stay
on and those not is consistent with the identifying assumption that the marriage probabilities
of all \compliers" do not depend on whether they hold any academic qualication or not (see
Section II).
As expected there is a strong positive association between a woman's academic qualication
and that of her spouse. Table 6 shows the OLS estimated eect of holding an academic quali-
cation at various levels on the probability of the spouse holding some academic qualication.
Women with academic qualications are much more likely to be married to husbands who also
have some academic qualication.23 Indeed, while the probability of being married to a part-
22We have also performed a similar analysis using only individuals aged 18 to 22. However, unsurprisingly, for
this age group the estimates are too imprecise to allow any meaningful conclusions to be drawn.
23More generally it is also true that there is marital sorting by qualication level. E.g. for any academic
qualication level j (including no qualication) a woman with qualication level j is more likely to be married to
28ner with some academic qualication increases with the individual's own qualication level, the
largest dierence obtains between women with no qualication and a level 1 qualication. Table
6 also shows the OLS estimated eect of a woman holding various levels of academic quali-
cations on the probability of her husband being economically active. Here the main dierence
is precisely between women with no academic qualication and some academic qualication:
conditional on holding some academic qualication, the partner's economic activity rate varies
little with the particular qualication level held by the woman.
Consider then how spouse characteristics vary with the individual's month of birth. Adopting
the same regression approach as above (and the same controls), the left panel of Figure 8 shows
how the probability of a woman being married to husband who holds some academic qualication
diers by her month of birth relative to the omitted February reference group. While somewhat
noisy, the gure suggests that women born in the rst ve months of the academic year are less
likely to be married to husbands with some academic qualication. The right panel of Figure 8
shows the corresponding results for the husbands' economic activity rates. This gure shows a
clear tendency for women born in the rst ve months of the academic year to be married to
economically inactive husbands.
Figure 9 looks more closely at the dierence in the properties of the husbands of those women
who were required to stay and those that were not. Following the approach from above, the
gure illustrates the estimated coecients on a dummy for having been required to stay on (using
regressions with the same controls as above), and with varying window sizes. The left panel shows
that women born after the January-February threshold are more likely to have husbands who
hold some academic qualication than are married women born before the threshold. Moreover,
the dierence is fairly stable with respect to the window size and is statistically signicant for
all window sizes except the smallest one. The right panel shows that the same is true also for
the economic activity rate of the husbands: those women who were required to stay on are more
frequently married to working husbands. Moreover, the gap is stable with respect to the window
size and is statistically signicant at every window size except the smallest one.
a qualication level j male than any other women, and vice versa.
29These ndings map into corresponding IV estimates. Table 7 presents the estimated eects
using OLS and using IV (and for varying window sizes). For the partner holding some academic
qualication, the IV estimates are always positive, reasonably stable with respect to window size,
and statistically signicant at all window sizes except the smallest one. The IV estimates are
smaller than the OLS estimates, but are more similar to the OLS estimate of specically holding
a level 1 academic qualication (See Table 6). Similarly, for the partner being economically
active, the IV estimates are always positive, stable with respect to window size, and statistically
signicant at all window sizes except the smallest one. Moreover, the IV estimates are very
similar to the OLS estimates.24
The evidence thus suggests that the requirement for some women to stay on for an extra term
at the compulsory school leaving age not only signicantly increased their rate of holding some
academic qualication, but also increased the rate at which they married husbands holding some
academic qualication and who (years later) are more frequently economically active. Indeed,
the IV estimates which purport to measure the causal eect of a woman holding an academic
qualication on the properties of her husband are very similar to the OLS estimates. This is in
itself somewhat surprising in that it suggests that most of the positive association we observe
between women's holding an academic qualication and the academic qualication and economic
activity rate of their husbands operate through causal channels. As the theoretical exposition
above made clear, an otherwise very plausible non-causal channel would be that individuals who
meet naturally tend to have correlated characteristics.
Robustness Analysis
The main nding so far has been that women born in February or later in the academic year
(i) more frequently hold some academic qualication, and (ii) are more frequently married to
24For comparison we have also estimated the eect of holding an academic qualication on the women's own
economic activity rate. While the IV point estimates are of the same order of magnitude as those for the partner's
economic activity rate, they are estimated less precisely. Details of these regressions are available on request from
the authors.
30husbands who hold some academic qualication and who are economically active. From this it
was argued that the holding of an academic qualication aected the properties of the women's
subsequent husbands.
In Figure 4 it was shown that the gap in the qualication rate only existed in academic
cohorts from 1957 to 1970, i.e. the academic cohorts born late enough to face the minimum
school leaving age of 16 but early enough to sit exams before the introduction of the GCSEs. A
natural robustness test is then to check whether month of birth relative to the January-February
threshold only matters for the 1957 to 1970 academic cohorts also in terms of marital outcomes.25
To this end we use an extended sample of married women which includes all academic cohorts
from 1952 through to 1975. We regress each spouse characteristic on the dummy for having
been required to stay on (along with survey year dummies, academic cohort dummies, ethnicity
dummies, and age in month in linear and square form), but we allow the eect of having been
required to stay on to be dierent in the \pre-period" (the ve academic cohorts 1952-1956),
the \main period" (the 1957-1970 academic cohorts), and the \post-period" (the ve academic
cohorts 1971-1975). As above, we do this for varying window sizes.
The results are provided in Table 8. Looking rst at spouse qualication rate, the top
part of Table 8 shows that, in the main period, having been required to stay on is associated
with about a one percentage point higher probability of being married to a partner who holds
some academic qualication. Moreover, this estimate is not sensitive to the window size and is
statistically signicant for all window sizes except the smallest. In contrast, in the pre-period,
the estimates are close to zero and never statistically signicant, while in the post period the
estimates are generally negative (but not very precise). Hence the positive relation between
having been required to stay on and spouse qualication rate only appear to exist in the main
period, which is also the only period in which having been required to stay on is associated with
a higher own qualication rate.
Turning to spouse economic activity rate, for the main period, having been required to stay on
25It should be noted however that this is not an ideal test in the sense that the 1957 to 1970 academic cohorts
were not the only ones to face the Easter-exit rule { the same rule also aected earlier and later cohorts.
31is associated with 0.6-0.8 percentage point higher probability of being married to an economically
active husband, with the estimates being stable with respect to window size and statistically
signicant for all window sizes except the smallest. However, in this case the estimates tend
also to be positive in the pre- and post-periods. Nevertheless, the estimates in these periods
slightly smaller, not statistically signicant, and are eectively zero for the smallest window size.
Hence, while slightly less conclusive, the results suggest that the main period is the only period
for which having been required to stay on is robustly associated with a higher probability of
being married to an economically active husband.
VI Conclusions
In this paper we have exploited a particular historical feature of the schooling laws in England
and Wales which allowed those individuals born in the rst ve months of the academic year to
leave education at Easter of the year in which they reached the minimum school leaving age, one
term ahead of their class mates born in the remaining seven months of the academic year. For
the 14 academic cohorts that we focus on, the interaction of this feature with the exam system
implied a discontinuity in the rate of holding some academic qualication with respect to month
of birth, with a woman born in February or later being more than 3.5 percentage points more
likely to hold some academic qualication than a woman born earlier in the academic year.
While there is a strong positive association between holding an academic qualication (at any
level) and being currently married for women beyond their mid-20s, there is no suggestion of any
dierence in the rate of being married between those women who were required to stay on for the
extra term and those who were not. Hence our ndings strongly suggest that holding an academic
qualication had no long-run eect on the probability of being married for the population that
we study. The absence of an eect on the probability of being married, however, does not imply
that holding an academic qualication was necessarily marriage-irrelevant. Indeed, those who,
due to their month of birth, were required to stay on for the extra term were found to be married
to husbands who more frequently hold some academic qualication and who more frequently are
32economically active. In fact, our results suggest that most of the observed positive association
between a woman's holding of an academic qualication and her husband's characteristics can
be given a causal interpretation.
A causal eect of a woman's academic qualication on the characteristics of her spouse can
obtain fundamentally through two distinct channels. First, a qualication can make her more
\attractive" in the marriage market, leading to a dierent marriage propensity at any given
match with a potential partner: with a qualication she may not be turned down by someone
who would have done so had she been unqualied, and she herself may become more inclined to
reject less qualied men. Second, it may be that investing in education leads a woman to meet
a dierent selection of potential partners. In this context it is interesting to note that those who
were required to stay on would typically not have had to change school or even class in order
to comply. Moreover, very few of those required to stay on for an extra term appear to have
responded by staying on even longer and obtain some higher level of qualication. This suggest
that the staying on requirement is unlikely to have aected the selection of potential partners
met directly through school.
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35Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable All Not Married Married
Age in Months 368.5 343.6 391.2
(85.2) (87.2) (76.5)
Ethnicity: White 0.968 0.955 0.980
(0.176) (0.208) (0.141)
Ethnicity: Asian 0.009 0.008 0.010
(0.095) (0.090) (0.099)
Ethnicity: Black 0.016 0.027 0.006
(0.126) (0.161) (0.080)
Ethnicity: Other 0.007 0.010 0.004
(0.083) (0.101) (0.062)
Ec. Active 0.687 0.692 0.682
(0.464) (0.462) (0.466)
No Ac. Qual 0.209 0.225 0.195
(0.407) (0.417) (0.396)
Level 1 Ac. Qual. 0.160 0.153 0.166
(0.366) (0.360) (0.372)
Level 2 Ac. Qual. 0.399 0.383 0.413
(0.490) (0.486) (0.492)
Level 3 Ac. Qual. 0.113 0.123 0.104
(0.316) (0.328) (0.305)
Level 4 Ac. Qual. 0.099 0.097 0.100
(0.298) (0.296) (0.300)
Level 5 Ac. Qual. 0.021 0.019 0.023
(0.144) (0.138) (0.150)
Nr. Obs. 226,965 108,071 118,894
Notes: The sample includes women observed in the UK Labour Force
Survey 1984-2006, living in England or Wales, born in the UK between
September 1957 and August 1971, and aged 18 or above at the time of
the survey.
36Table 2: Estimates of Discontinuity in Family Characteristics at January-February Threshold
Window
Family Background Variable Sep-Jun Oct-May Nov-Apr Dec-Mar Jan-Feb
Father's Age at Birth (Months) 0.811 0.474 1.207 0.572 1.250
(0.921) (1.031) (1.195) (1.450) (2.097)
Mother's Age at Birth (Months) -0.557 -1.026 -0.444 -0.442 0.987
(0.733) (0.820) (0.955) (1.175) (1.690)
Father Economically Active 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.014
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Mother Economically Active -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
Father's Highest Ac. Qual. Lev. = 1-2 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.002
(0.004)
 (0.005)
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Father's Highest Ac. Qual. Lev. = 3 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)












Mother's Highest Ac. Qual. Lev. = 3 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Mother's Highest Ac. Qual. Lev. = 4-5 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Asian 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Black -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Other Ethnicity -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Notes: The table reports the estimated coecients on a dummy for being born in February or later in the academic
year in a set of linear regressions where each family characteristics is an outcome variable. Each regression also
includes a full set of academic cohort- and survey year dummies. Columns indicate \window size" around the
January-February threshold. Signicance levels:  : 1%  : 5%
37Table 3: Eect of Having Been Required to Stay on on the Probability of Holding Academic
Qualication Level j or Above by Window Size.
Window
Qual. Lev. Oct-May Nov-Apr Dec-Mar Jan-Feb











Level 3 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)






Level 5 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Nr. Obs. 151,629 112,726 76,016 37,652
Notes: The table reports the estimated coecients on a dummy for being
born in February or later in the academic year in a set of linear regressions
where the outcome variable in each case is a dummy for holding an academic
qualication at level j or above. All regressions also include a full set of
academic cohort dummies, survey year dummies and ethnicity dummies, as
well as age measured in months in linear, square and cubic form. Columns
indicate \window size" around the January-February threshold. Signicance
levels:  : 1%  : 5%
38Table 4: Eect of Having Been Required to Stay on on the Probability of Leaving Full-Time
Education at Various Ages
Window
Age Left FTE Nov-Apr Dec-Mar Jan-Feb
Age 16 or below -0.003 -0.005 -0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Age 17 -0.003 -0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Age 18 0.005 0.005 -0.000
(0.002)
 (0.003) (0.004)
Age 19 or above 0.000 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Nr. Obs. 112,726 76,016 37,652
Notes: The table reports the estimated coecients on a dummy
for being born in February or later in the academic year in a set
of linear regressions where the outcome variable in each case is a
dummy for having left full time education at age j. Each regres-
sion also includes a full set of academic cohort dummies, survey
year dummies and ethnicity dummies, as well as age measured
in months in linear, square and cubic form. Columns indicate
\window size" around the January-February threshold. Signi-
cance levels:  : 1%  : 5%.
39Table 5: Estimates of the Eect of Holding an Academic Qualication on the Probability of
Being Currently Married among Women Aged 23 or Above.
Window
Outcome Variable Sep-Jun Oct-May Nov-Apr Dec-Mar Jan-Feb
OLS








Currently Married -0.051 -0.011 -0.049 -0.011 0.068
(0.080) (0.083) (0.087) (0.106) (0.145)
Nr. Obs. 159,944 128,157 95,475 64,377 31,869
Notes: The table reports the estimated coecients on a dummy for holding some academic qualication in a
set of regressions where in each case the outcome variable is a dummy for being currently married. In the IV
regressions, a dummy for being born in February or later in the academic year is used as instrument for holding
some academic qualication. Each regression also includes a full set of academic cohort dummies, survey year
dummies and ethnicity dummies, as well as age measured in months in linear, square and cubic form. Columns
indicate \window size" around the January-February threshold. Signicance levels:  : 1%  : 5%
40Table 6: Eect of Holding Academic Qualications on the Probability of Spouse Holding Some
Academic Qualication and on the Probability of the Spouse being Economically Active, Esti-
mated by OLS
Dependent Variable
Qual. Lev. Ac. Qual. Ec. Activity




















Nr. Obs. 114,519 117,801
Notes: The table reports the estimated coecients on a
set of dummies for the woman holding academic qual-
ication level 1-5 in two regressions where the outcome
variables are a dummy for the husband holding some aca-
demic qualication and a dummy for the husband being
economically active, respectively. All regressions also in-
clude a full set of academic cohort dummies, survey year
dummies and ethnicity dummies, as well as age measured
in months in linear, square and cubic form. Signicance
levels:  : 1%  : 5%.
41Table 7: Estimates of the Eect of Holding an Academic Qualication on Husband's Economic
Characteristics.
Window
Outcome Variable Sep-Jun Oct-May Nov-Apr Dec-Mar Jan-Feb
OLS



























Nr. Obs. 92,267 77,048 57,000 38,360 18,977
Notes: The table reports the estimated coecients on a dummy for holding some academic qualication in a set
of regressions with outcome variables as indicated in the table. In the IV regressions, a dummy for being born
in February or later in the academic year is used as instrument for holding some academic qualication. Each
regression also includes a full set of academic cohort dummies, survey year dummies and ethnicity dummies, as
well as age measured in months in linear, square and cubic form. Columns indicate \window size" around the
January-February threshold. Signicance levels:  : 1%  : 5%
42Table 8: Eect of Having Been Required to Stay on Spouse Characteristics by Period
Window
Variable Sep-Jun Nov-Apr Jan-Feb
Spouse holds Academic Qualication
RTSO*(Ac.Coh. 1952-56) 0.001 0.001 -0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010)




RTSO*(Ac.Coh. 1971-75) 0.004 -0.001 -0.019
(0.011) (0.014) (0.024)
Nr. Obs. 150,099 88,890 29,490
Spouse is Economically Active
RTSO*(Ac.Coh. 1952-56) 0.005 0.006 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)




RTSO*(Ac.Coh. 1971-75) 0.006 0.006 -0.004
(0.007) (0.009) (0.015)
Nr. Obs. 154,314 91,386 30,350
Notes: The table reports the estimated coecients on a dummy for being born in
February or later in the academic year (\RTSO"), interacted with three dummies
indicating subperiod, in a set of linear regressions where the outcome variable, in
each case, is a dummy for the husband holding some academic qualication or be-
ing economically active. All regressions also include a full set of academic cohort
dummies, survey year dummies and ethnicity dummies, as well as age measured in
months in linear, square and cubic form. Columns indicate \window size" around the
January-February threshold. Signicance levels:  : 1%  : 5%.
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